2010年6月12日星期六

Lecture 14 Radicals

European Civilization, 1648-1945: 

Lecture 14

Radicals

Transcript

October 22, 2008

Professor John Merriman: So, what I want to do today is resist the temptation to talk about anarchism the entire time. I sent around the terms for today of which I only forgot one or two. What I think I'll do at the beginning is I'm going to talk very quickly about socialism, and the difference between revolutionary socialism and reform socialism. Add syndicalism to the mix, and these are all terms that I sent to you, so I'm not going to write them on the board, because I need the board. Then for most of the lecture I'm going to talk about anarchism. Anarchists didn't want to reform the state. They didn't want to seize control of the state either by revolution or by electoral process. They wanted to destroy the state. So, I'm going to talk about those guys for a while.

Most anarchists were not terrorists, but at the end I'm going to talk about a guy that I followed around for four or five years who was a terrorist, and arguably--it's a book I just finished--one can find the origins of modern terrorism in this guy, who is called Émile Henry. This will fit into Paris. It's obviously sort of a sub-theme in this course, and so is the state and capitalism. This particular person, Émile Henry, set out to bomb and to kill. His targets changed the name of the game for terrorists. That's obviously what I can't wait to talk about. But first I'm going to just review briefly for you, it's getting briefer every second that I think about this, the socialist stuff, which you can read about. With the rise of mass politics in Europe in the 1880s and 1890s, there was the rise of mass socialist parties.

Basically just to review: there are two kinds of socialism. There were the revolutionary socialists, of which Marx was an obvious example and his son-in-law Paul Lafargue, a name you don't have to retain, who brought Marxist theory to France, who believed that revolution would come when the proletariat was class-conscious and after a bourgeois revolution, of which he basically thought 1848 had been a good example following in 1789. And the proletariat would rise up and break their chains and bring this brave new world. And, so, there were revolutionary socialists in Italy, in Spain, and in France, and even a few in Germany.

Reform socialists said, "Look, states are becoming stronger and stronger, and can break revolutions very easily. Look what happened to the Paris Commune of 1871 when about 25,000 people are massacred, men, women and children are gunned down, and that the way to bringing social reform and abolishing the abuses of capitalism is through reform." This is the reformist tradition in Germany. It's identified with somebody who's in the book, Edouard Bernstein. And you can see this in the growth of the SPD, the German Socialist Reformist Party, which was the largest party in the Reichstag in 1914 when war breaks out.

What you do is if you organize, you can--legislatures, if you have enough socialists and enough well-meaning other people in the legislatures, in the Reichstag, or in the Chambre des Députés, or the other parliaments in places that had parliaments, then you can vote in laws. You can vote in mine safety regulations, because mining accidents killed so many people. There's one in the Pas de Calais where hundreds and hundreds of people, a thousand people get killed in one accident in about 1910 or 1911. You can pass an eight-hour day or a ten-hour day. You can pass laws making it harder and harder to employ children, particularly in dangerous tasks. You can do things for women. You could do things for families. If you elect the right kind of people, you can have a revolution through reform, through the ballot.

And the great socialist leaders such as Bernstein, whom I just mentioned, or the great Jean Jaurès, whose death on the 31st of July in 1914 was really the end of an era and the beginning of another era, a scary era of the war--people had that sense. He was the one who in France unified the reform socialists and the revolutionary socialists, though there are still fissures in their approaches. Of course, the old revolutionary socialists would become the Communists after 1920, when the French Communist Party is begun in the wake of the Russian Revolution, which seemed to be, even though it was a revolution in a very complex situation, that seemed to say that you can have a revolution. But anyway, reform socialists dominate in Germany. They dominate in France. They dominate in Belgium. The Socialist Party is terribly important in Italy; they become more important in Spain as well. Those are the two big traditions.

Some of the tensions between revolutionary socialists and reform socialists can be seen in the fact that revolutionary socialists said, "Look, if you are working in the Reichstag and you're trying to get better insurance plans," ironically it was Bismarck's Germany that gives really the first substantial insurance program for workers, "what you're doing is you're propping up the bourgeois state. You're buying into it. You're supporting indirectly their armies that crush workers and strikes," and they did in the heroic age of syndicalism, but more about that in a minute, 1895 to about 1907 in France. But in other countries it's about the same thing. "You're propping up the bourgeois state by participating in electoral politics." But lots of revolutionary socialists, and this is all in the book so don't worry about this, but a lot of them say, "Look, if we don't run candidates and elections, how are they going to know about us?" So, they, too, would run candidates and elections. So, they're put at really kind of coincé. They're really sort of stuck between a rock and a hard place, because they're running candidates in elections in which they do not believe.

I'm not here talking about Russia, because that is more complicated with the Bolsheviks, and the Mensheviks, and the socialist revolutionaries, and we will come back to them. I'm talking basically about Western Europe. You have to imagine that Lenin and the other Russian socialists are sort of walking around the lakes of Geneva and of Zurich in exile and trying to imagine this future. But that's the big difference between socialists, reform and revolutionary. Now, to make things even more complicated, you have a group called the syndicalists. The word "syndicalist" is an English word which I sent along on your friendly email from yours truly.

Syndicalist, the word comes from the French word for unions, which is a syndicat. What they said is, "Hang on." They kind of believed with the revolutionary socialists, saying, "If you get involved in electoral process, you are propping up this corrupt bourgeois state. You are propping up this dynamic duo of the state and capitalism." Syndicalists say, "Look, we will organize from the ground up, beginning in the shop floor, the factory. That will be not only a means to obtain a revolution, it's a way of seeing what the future world will be like when everybody tutoies everybody or Dus everybody. The kind of relations, the friendly equal relations of the shop floor become, after the revolution, the way the world will be organized." In the South of Europe, in Italy and in Spain, these folks are called, and I sent this around to you, anarcho-syndicalists.

You see a transition here. Anarcho-syndicalists. Because they're rejecting the state and they're looking in the future, the decentralized organization is part of it. Anarcho-syndicalists have considerable influence in Spain and Italy. They believe in direct action, and sabotage, and strikes, but in union organization. One of the most interesting--I mention him in the book--Fernand Pelloutier, who wrote a book called The Dying Society, was one of the theoreticians of anarcho-syndicalism, of syndicalism. He was dying. He was dying of TB. Though he was not a worker, tuberculosis was a working-class disease. Go to Pennsylvania. Go to West Virginia. Tuberculosis, the ravages of the mines in the United States, were just incredible. In porcelain factories and all sorts of places, glass factories all over the place.

Pelloutier creates these things called labor exchanges. He's one of the people who come to these things called labor exchanges, bourse de travail, you call them in French, which were towns where you had municipal socialists in power at the municipal level--and you did, in some cities, are giving municipal funds to start these labor exchanges which are buildings. You can still see them. When I was invited to Limoges to give a big talk by the Conféderation Général du Travail, we started the apéro, the first round of drinks, about noon in the labor exchange, in the maison du peuple, the house of the people. They were places where workers coming from other places could come and get a meal, get some money and, above all, find out about jobs. So, syndicalists--the way they imagine the future, and preparing for this brave new world of post-revolutionary relationships, that has an important privileged place in the way they view the world.

There was an engineer called Georges Sorel, whose name I should have send around, S-O-R-E-L. He comes to the notion of the general strike. One day all workers will simply put down their tools and say, "Hell with you, capitalism. Hell with you, the State. And they will bring capitalism to its knees." It doesn't really ever work out that way, does it? The capitalists and the State win the day. So, having rushed through all of that, let me talk about what I want to talk about. That is anarchism, of which there is only a couple short, and I hope sprightly, paragraphs in which you're reading. I am not an anarchist. Sometimes when I give talks at various places--I was at St. Louis recently, and other places, people at the end will think--hopefully, they'll never think I'm a terrorist, because I'm certainly not, and when I talk about this guy I do not do so with affection or admiration. But I know him because I followed him around. I followed him around.

Most anarchists were not terrorists. One wants to make that clear. It's not surprising that the great strengths of anarchism are in Spain in Catalonia and in Andalusia in the south of Spain and in southern Italy. Why? Because that's where the Italian and the Spanish states have very limited success in convincing people that they're Spanish or Italian. Why should they believe they're Spanish or Italian? Southern Italians thought that the republic was a monarchy. But the progressive monarchy, so called, was a plot launched by tax collectors and industrial capitalists in the North of Italy. In Andalusia and in Catalonia were the Civil Guard, who tended to be from Galicia, a conservative part of Spain where the odious Franco was from or from Castile, a huge area around Madrid. It was easy to see how they associated the state with something that they didn't want. In writing about anarchism, I tried to put myself and tried to think of how anarchists viewed the world.

I want to tell you a story that's a true story. If you're trying to imagine how anarchists viewed the world, this story is not a bad one. It's about a cork worker making corks for bottles of sherry in the south of Spain. He's dying. He'd been an anarchist his entire life. He hated the state. He hated capitalism. He hated the church. He's dying. He's on his deathbed. He had married a woman from a religiously practicing Catholic family. In the scene in this room in which he's dying, in one part of the room is his family, who hated organized religion, who view it as a prop for capitalism and the state. On the other side of the room are people who are not so sure. They went to church sometimes. They knew the priest.

When he's lying there, the end is near. His wife's family says, "Pedro, don't you want me to bring a lawyer in? A lawyer who will take your last will." Anarchists don't have wills and they don't have very much property. The other side of the room is just utter terror, horror. How can they suggest such a thing, that Pedro is going to make a will? That's a bourgeois thing to do, to make a will. Then somebody else from his wife's family says, "Pedro, the end is near. Don't you want us to get a priest for the last rights?" He'd never set foot in a church and proudly so. Consternation on the other side of the room. How will it all end? How will Pedro end his life? With a lawyer and a priest?

So, Pedro looks up and he says, "Go and get me a lawyer. Bring me a lawyer." Then he says, "Go and tell father," the priest, "to come to see me." Joy--utter consternation. Pedro's lying in a bed in the middle. So, pretty soon the lawyer comes dressed in his little suit. He doesn't yet have a calculator to tote up the bill, but he's got his legal pad. He's never been in that house before. He comes down by the bed and he says, "Pedro, you have a few possessions, a fork, a knife, a couple of plates. Don't you want to give me your will now?" Pedro says, "Wait a minute. Wait a minute, señor. Wait a minute." Then the priest comes. He has his purple--I remember this from Jesuit high school days--thing that they wear on Easter. He has his little case also, which he has the holy oil to bless Pedro and give him the last rights. He comes close and he says, "Pedro, the end is near. You've led a good life, but I haven't seen you in church very much or ever, for that matter. Your children are not baptized. Don't you want to make a confession? You're going to meet your maker soon. Don't you want to make a confession to me right now? Nobody can hear you. Don't you have something you want to tell me? Isn't there something you can tell me?"

Consternation on one side, silent joy on the other. Pedro says to the lawyer, "Come here, señor. I want you to stand on the left side of my bed." He says to the priest, "Father, come here please. I want you to stand on the right side of my bed." Then he smiles a smile of utter contempt. He says, "Now you can all see both sides of the family. Like Christ, I am dying between two thieves." And he died. To imagine the kind of hate that anarchists had of soldiers, and priests, and of officials, and of Castilian Guardia Civil, that was how anarchism was born. When was anarchism born? There's a couple antecedents in the eighteenth century, but they're terribly irrelevant people that hardly anyone read, including a British one.

It really starts with Proudhon, a name a sent around. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. He was from the east of France, from Besançon, in the mountainous Franche-Comté. He believed that if you didn't have the state, the people could live pretty much as with a little bit of prosperity that they had, a few chickens, a little piece of land. People tended to live like that there. It was a place where nobody had very much but everybody had enough to get along. He writes the following. It's in my lecture notes.

To be governed is to be watched, inspected, spied upon, directed, law-driven, numbered, regulated, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, checked, estimated, valued, censored, commanded by creatures who have neither the right nor the wisdom nor the virtue to do so. To be governed at every operation at every transaction, noted, registered, counted, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, prevented, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished, under the pretext of public utility in the name of the general interest to be placed under taxes, drilled, fleeced, exploited, monopolized, extorted from, squeezed, poached, and robbed. At the slightest resistance or the first word of complaint to be repressed, fired, vilified, harassed, hunted down, abused, clubbed, disarmed, bound, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed, and to crown all, mocked, ridiculed, derided, outraged, dishonored. That is government. That is its justice. That is its morality.

He wrote a pamphlet in 1841 called What is Property? His answer is, "Property is theft." He didn't mean that all property was theft. What he meant was too much property was theft, or unearned property was theft. Proudhon had lots of influence among some peasants, but mostly artisans. In the world, by the way, that the great painter, Gustave Courbet painted a lot, in the area around Besançon or Nantes, lots of really marvelous paintings of people at work, the stone breakers and people just working their guts out for very little. Proudhon, in 1848, it's said he went down in Paris and put a brick on a barricade and threw up, nauseated by the thought of violence, of revolution.

His successors, sort of the leaders of the anarchist movements, were Mikhail Bakunin, an enormously tall, bearded, heavy-drinking, heavy-eating, heavy-sweating Russian noble, a prince who was an anarchist who said, "The revolution will come. It will come with a single spark and all the hundreds of millions of toilers, the serfs will rise up, and they will slay their social betters, and create this new brave world based upon their village harmonies." He said, "Destruction is a creative passion," entre guillemets. Destruction is a creative passion. In 1848 he led police on a merry chase. He spent time in the Russian slammer. He escapes through Japan, goes through the United States and ends up back in London, terrified people. His image, this is before photographs or photographs are just starting out, and there are photographs of him.

He met Marx, whom he hated, and Marx hated him. He thought that Marx was ruining class struggle, was ruining revolution by preaching over and over again about waiting for revolution. Class-conscious workers. What you need is peasants to rise up as they had in Pugachev's rebellion, and all the other rebellions in the early seventeenth and eighteenth century. He dies in the early 1870s, a phenomenal character. The other Russian, a gentle man, a geographer, Peter Kropotkin, K-R-O-P-O-T-K-I-N, is in the book. He wrote a pamphlet called The Anarchist Morality. When you get rid of the state, people are basically good. Anarchists believe that people are good. There's a tradition from Rousseau, by the way, there too. Rousseau, who lived in the east of France, or what would become France, around Chambéry, who believed in the primitive.

Anarchists believe that primitive social relations and even primitive ways of producing things, just associations you enter in because you want to, were the future. Kropotkin, who at the end of his life was once toasted by the king of England, and who had turned against the Russian Revolution--he died in, I think, 1921 or 1922. He was terrified, just disgusted by the Russian Revolution, which was already creating a centralized state. That's what he hated. He hated states. "You must destroy the state." But he was a gentle man. Yet he and a guy called Paul Brousse, you don't have to remember, who became a socialist leader and then went nuts later--that's not a very clinical term, but he had big problems later--they create the term "propaganda by the deed." What is a deed? A deed is a bomb. A deed is an attack. It's the murder of an official. The anarchists weren't the only ones doing this stuff.

There was a Russian group, briefly mentioned, called Narodnaya Volya, who believed in kind of a hierarchical post-revolutionary system. What they wanted to do was set out and kill officials. But so did the anarchist terrorists. They killed officials, one of which you've heard of already. You've probably heard of some of the others. President McKinley in 1901, Buffalo, New York, is killed by somebody who received funds from an anarchist organization in Patterson, New Jersey, I think, or is that Bresci? Anyway, Bresci kills King Umberto I of Italy, another anarchist assassination. They kill five or six leaders during this period of anarchist heyday really, the late nineteenth century. King Umberto I of Italy said that he considered assassination a professional risk. There were two attempts on his life and the third one nails him.

Alexander II, who liberated the serfs, is killed when he gets out of a sled to look at a bomb that doesn't work. Elizabeth, the empress of Austria-Hungary, who couldn't stand Franz Joseph and lived apart from him, is assassinated as well. But most anarchists were not killers. Now, if you think of American history, those of you who had Glenda's course, or David Blight's, other people here, you might know about Haymarket, the Haymarket affair in the 1880s. There they hanged four anarchists who were called les pendus in France. They had enormous influence. The les pendus were the hanged, as they're swinging in the breeze in a Chicago prison yard. They were anarchists and they inspire someone like Emma Goldman, who was a Russian-Jewish immigrant to the United States, who becomes an important American anarchist.

Anarchists set off to kill policemen, or to kill heads of state, or to kill generals; propaganda by the deed, the spark that will ignite this revolution. But the man you see before you--and I have become today a very modern man. I want to tell you, because this is my first try at PowerPoint. The person that you see before you is the guy I've been following around. I got interested in him for two reasons. One is that he is the first, really, along with a bombing at an opera in Barcelona, the Liceo to target ordinary people. To say that people of a social class were guilty because they were who they were. The spark does not necessarily have to be lit by killing a head of a state. Sadi Carnot, who would get his in 1894 on the Rue de la République in Lyon, president of France. He takes the decision to kill ordinary people.

Lots of terrorists since then have taken that decision. A classic example is insurgents in Punjab in India in the 1920s, bombing officers' clubs. There's a terrifying scene in that fantastic, but very difficult movie--because of the torture scene, I can't even use it in the French History course, The Battle of Algiers. You are with this woman who's planting a bomb in a café and she sees the people who are going to die. She sees babies with their mothers. She sees people having a drink in the French community there. She takes the decision to place the bomb. I believe that it kind of started with this guy. This is, again, not somebody I admire. I know him. Everywhere he's lived I've been. I guess if you're going to write a book about somebody as a prism on something or other, it's good to pick somebody who only lived to be twenty-one, because it's a shorter book. He was guillotined in May 1894.

Again, I do not admire him, but I'm going to tell you about him anyway. With the help of PowerPoint! How in the hell do I do this? I've got to remember how to do this. All right. That's Émile Henry. His father was acommunard who was condemned to death, somebody who'd fought in the Commune. So, this guy is born in Spain. His father contracted mercury poisoning in Spain, and comes back to France after the amnesty and dies. He has an older brother and a younger brother. What he does is, on a day in 1894, he sets out with a bomb and he walks in the fancy boulevards that, for him, represent all of the class differences between wealthy and poor people, center versus periphery and all of that. He goes down to the Café Terminus, which is on your right. It's those awnings there near the Gare Saint-Lazare.

I've had the rather odd experience of twice, once with friends and once with my son, having eaten in the restaurant that my book subject blew up, because it's still there, and sitting at the same table. He goes to four or five cafes, but there are not enough innocent people in them. So, he goes to the Terminus where there is a gypsy orchestra playing, pays for two beers. That seems a little odd, anarchist paying for a beer, because the right to theft was something that they still believed in, many of them, not all. Most were not terrorists, remember that. He goes into the Café Terminus. He gets a cigar. He lights the fuse. He throws it toward a chandelier and it blows up, killing one and wounding about eighteen people. That's not him. This anarchist is called Malatesta, who doesn't look particularly scary there.

Émile Henry had gone back to the Paris region. His mother had a very pitiful auberge. This is the era of bomb attacks in the early 1890s. That's a marmite, as bombs were sometimes called. He became an anarchist. His brother had already become an anarchist. To put yourself into the early 1890s in Paris, ordinary people, but not so much as the elites, were terrified of anarchist bombers. Ravachol, a name I sent around, who was a poor, pathetic in many ways but extremely poor guy who'd been sent out to beg by his mother. They had almost no money. They're from a place called Saint-Chamond, near Saint-Étienne. Ravachol was a counterfeiter and finally a murderer. He suffocates to death a hermit who had a mini fortune hidden in his bizarre cottage near Saint-Étienne. He escapes from the police and he goes to Paris.

In 1891 police beat the hell out of three anarchists in a march, a rather one-sided brawl. Two of them are condemned to big-time sentences. Ravachol decides to go and to kill the prosecuting attorney. He places a bomb, not knowing where the apartment was, and the bomb blows up. Then he set other bombs, too. After having done this, he goes to a restaurant, and he eats rather well, and he engages a waiter in conversation. He tries to convince the waiter to be an anarchist. The waiter sees he has a scar on his left hand, Ravachol did. Then he stupidly goes back later and eats in the same restaurant. Instead of bringing the second course, the waiter brings the police. After a tremendous struggle, Ravachol is captured, put on trial for his life, and he memorably holds up--how do you work this thing?--anyway, he is guillotined. He's really kind of a bastard. More than that, and he killed other people too, probably. But he finally is guillotined.

Two things happened, not only in Paris but in other places. The people of means living in the fancy quarters are extremely frightened. There are all sorts of death threats that get sent around. Ravachol, to those anarchist terrorists, he becomes a martyr. Look, here his head is framed by the guillotine. Ravachol, who had been betrayed by an anarchist friend, dies at age thirty-three. Christ died at age thirty-three, betrayed by a friend. So, he becomes this sort of, for radical anarchists, he becomes a vision of how life should be. There are songs called La Ravachol. There's another one called The Dynamite Polka, being sung.

Dynamite, from the point of view of anarchists, leveled the playing field. They viewed dynamite rather as the way in which muskets helped end the domain of feudalism. It levels the playing field. Dynamite, after all, was invented by whom? By Nobel, as in the Nobel Prize. So the people who support dynamite in French are called the dynamitards, the dynamiters. The Dynamite Polka. In Montmartre, where you have a lot of anarchist writers and artists. Pizarro is an anarchist. The literary and art critic, above all art, Félix Fénéon, who was a friend of Émile Henry, is an anarchist as well. So, it's into this world that the young Émile Henry. Here you go. Here's this one. I've read hundreds of these things that said, "You've always been hard with your domestics. You're going to be blown up. Death to the riches." There are hundreds of these things. They're sent all over Paris, not just the fancy neighborhoods.

There, hundreds and hundreds of times, at the airports you hear these explosions sometimes as they blow up suitcases that haven't been claimed. That's the first known machine that blows up suspect items, including lots of bad jokes--sardine cans with a little bit of powder left in them, and that kind of thing. It's in this world that Emile Henry learns to hate, and that he certainly does. That's where his mom had her auberge. Ironically, it's near Euro Disney now, but then it was a village. That's not the one. It was up the street a little bit. I did follow him around, you can see. There's his mother there. Up on the right is one of the places he lived, always around, except for one occasion, Montmartre.

That's his girlfriend. He had unrequited love. She had the disadvantage of being married to another anarchist. He writes her clumsy poems. He falls in love with her. She blows him off. But in the end, she wanted to take full credit before the press for having been the lover of Émile Henry after his deeds, his bombs, but he wasn't. That's one of the places he worked in Paris. I love that. That's a beautiful sign and that company hasn't existed since World War I. But you can follow him around. In 1892, Émile Henry, two years earlier, he had killed before. There was a strike in the south of France, glassworkers in Camaux. The third block on the left is number eleven and that's where the company is. They found a bomb there placed about 11:00 in the morning. Right there. That's not the way it looked then. I've gotten in there twice to see where he placed the bomb. My son gets a little tired. "Dad, do we have to look at another one of these places?" They find the bomb and they carry it down to the police station, which is still there. It was a reversible bomb, which means when the chemicals run together, boom! It kills five people terribly, five policeman and a secretary among them. Body parts all over the place.

Emile Henry, that's one of the places he lived. He is eliminated from the list of suspects because they said he could not have gone on the two errands his boss sent that day from near the station of the north, down toward the center of Paris, then up toward the Arc de Triomphe, gone back to Montmartre and gotten the bomb, placed the bomb, and gotten back in two hours and fifteen minutes. When he went on trial for his life in 1894, a detective said, "Yes, he could have done that in two hours and fifteen minutes." So, being a bit of an empiricist, I did it. And I replaced tramway and Omnibus with a bus and with a Metro. I never take cabs, but I took, instead of a carriage--of course I didn't take that--I took a cab and I subtracted eleven minutes when my cab couldn't turn left on the Avenue de l'Opéra. He did it. There's no question about it. In fact, when they did the reconstitution of this building, he knew every single part of this building. He did it. There's no question about it.

Why did he hate so? Part of it again, this is the theme we've talked about before, was the social geography of Paris. Everywhere he lived, with one exception that you just saw, was in people's Paris. All of the facades are still there. That's where he lived on the Rue Véron, on the very top floor. That's where the poor lived. He gets the bomb there in 1892. They hated Sacré-Coeur, for reasons you already know. It was a symbol of penance for the Franco-Prussian War and penance for the commune. His father was one of the people condemned to death, who was lucky enough to get out and not be executed.

In a Zola novel that's very underappreciated called Paris, published in 1898, it's about a priest who, to take an REM song, is "losing his religion." His brother is an anarchist, Guillaume. He has fantasies about blowing this place up. I think it's ugly as hell. I once went with my wife to see where they cast the huge bell that would drive people nuts and still does, called la Savoyarde. But that bell wasn't there. But as a symbol, you can't walk around Montmartre and not see it from various places. He becomes a terrorist because the people that he sees around him are very, very poor, and he convinces himself, even though he's an intellectual, he's a bourgeois. He could have gotten into the École Polytechnique, which is a super, Grande École. It's a big engineering school. He's a great student.

He's an intellectual. That's the other thing. Besides picking "innocent people." All people are innocent, but you know what I mean. The other thing is he is not a sad sack or a dangerous one like Ravachol. He is not a guy called Vaillant, who places a little, teeny tack bomb and throws it in the Chamber of Deputies to call attention to the plight of the poor, and is guillotined. The first person in the nineteenth century guillotined who did not kill somebody. This guy goes out to kill. There's a scene in an old Balzac novel called--all Balzac novels by definition are old, obviously--Old Goriot, Père Goriot, in which Rastignac, who was sort of this down-and-out noble who wants to make the big time in Paris by sleeping with all the right people. After Goriot dies, he's up in the northeast quadrant of Paris at Père Lachaise cemetery. He waves his hand down toward the fancy quarters, down ironically near where Café Terminus would be. The fancy quarters, even before there are boulevards, and he says the equivalent of, "It's war between you and me now, baby." That's a rough translation, but that's what he said.

Émile Henry, walking around on the hills and seeing people walk down to be domestics, because they couldn't afford to take the tramway or the Omnibus, horse-drawn carriages. He waves his hand and says, "It's war between you and me, baby, and I will ignite the spark that kills you MFs right away." That's what he does. When he walked out of his apartment, he looked down and happily he didn't have to see the Tour Montparnasse, which hadn't been built after huge payoffs in the early 1970s. Disgusting! But what he could see were these symbols of capitalism, the state, and the church. What did he see? He saw the Eiffel Tower, which was five years old, a symbol of the republic and the bourgeois revolution, as he saw it. He sees the Pantheon, where they buried all these Napoleonic marshals who basically got a lot of people killed if they didn't get themselves killed. And he sees Notre Dame. He says, "It's war between you and me."

This is the façade. I love this stuff. The inside building where he lived isn't there anymore. Now it's kind of an area that's a little bit sketchy. There's a lot of drug dealing. When I got myself into there, I had to kind of--I didn't want to look like a plainclothes policeman. Do I risk looking like a plainclothes policeman? No. I didn't want to look like a tourist sort of slumming. I don't look like that much, either. When I went by these guys who were sort of hanging out there, I said, "Salut les gars," or "Hi guys, what's up?" I got myself in there to see where he once had lived. The point of that is that you can see what he saw. That gate is exactly the same as that day when he walked out to kill for the second time.

His bomb that he threw into the Terminus--this is back in 1894, this is where we started. It hit a chandelier and exploded. He said at his trial that he threw it too low. He should have thrown it higher; it would have killed more people. Only one died. He'd already killed five before. People are terrified. They run all over the place. It was speculated that his was sort of an indirect suicide, because his unrequited love, this lady who lived in the Boulevard Voltaire, whose name was Elisa. But no, because he tries to escape in order to kill again. They chase him and they catch him. A barber helps catch him. A controller on the tramway hits him with the control mechanism that punches tickets, just like in the old days on those things, not that I ever was in a horse-drawn carriage. They get him and they take him.

He's arrested for murder, Émile Henry, and is put on trial. That's where he's writing his mother. We know a lot about him, because they kept all these documents. It was so fun doing this. I love stuff like that. His mother was devastated, as you can well imagine. She cannot believe that her Émile could have done this. He was her pride and joy after the death of the father. Those of you who have been to Paris will recognize this. This is the Conciergerie. This is where Louis XVI, Danton, Robespierre, Marie Antoinette, and others awaited, they put their head between the little window, as they used to say, la petite fenêtre, to be guillotined. It's also got one of the three most magnificent gothic halls anywhere in France.

His guards took notes every single day about what he said and the anarchist songs. They want to prove that somebody else was involved in this. There probably was somebody else in the 1892 attack who helped him close the bomb. So, Emile Henry goes on trial in April of 1894. He makes the famous declaration in which he says, "You have hung us in Chicago," Haymarket; "You have garroted us," that's slowly strangling us, "in Barcelona." When Franco was croaking in 1975, they were garroting an anarchist even at that time, 1975 in Barcelona. "You have shot us in Germany." I don't know how they killed them in Italy, but, "You've killed us in Italy." He says, "You, the bourgeois, who are in this café, you are not innocent. It's because of you, the petty bourgeois. You support les gros," the big ones, "on every possible occasion. You forget about us when your factory owners throw us out when we can no longer work any longer, or women workers happy not to have had to prostitute themselves in order to pay their rent and their husbands' rent by the end of the month. But what you can never do is destroy anarchism. Its roots are too deep."

On the 22nd of May 1894--that's what I said about writing a book about somebody that doesn't live very long--he is executed at Place Roquette in Paris, which was, by intent, the place where the state meted out justice, right in the heart of working-class Paris. That was not an idle selection of a space. We have his notes up to the very end of his life. This guy, Deibler, is the executioner. Monsieur de Paris. This is the executioner meting out, in quotes, "justice." Public execution, by the way, in France, maybe I said this already, was in 1936 at Versailles--the last execution was in 1974. I'm constantly asked by people all sorts of political opinions in France, where executions, public capital punishment is repudiated by most everybody, how that we still have it here. This is not a political diatribe, so I won't say anything about that.

Anyway, Deibler, his son was the last public executioner, did the last public execution back when. There he is. There's somebody else putting their head through the little window. That's what I mean by that. That's the equivalent of his mug shot. So, he was wrong about the roots of anarchism being too deep. What clearly happens is that there was a trial during that same summer where they put a lot of intellectuals on trial who did nothing except to say that they were anarchists or to criticize the state. What my book--it's really a book also about state terrorists. It's about the overreaction of states. Our state is a good example of that, and the tendency to try to denigrate anyone who doesn't agree with us as being terrorists, whether they were or not.

The intellectuals, the jury sees through it in 1894 and only a couple thieves are condemned and them not to death. There's anarchists in 1968 in Paris. There's a band of anarchists in about 1909, 1910, 1911, that hold up stores with most modern tools, shotguns and things like that. The anarchist attacks were over. There was no question about that. That doesn't make Émile Henry less interesting. As an intellectual, the cross-class kind of--you see this in Middle-Eastern terrorism, too. My book is also about state terrorists. What stops anarchist attacks in Spain is the fact that the public becomes aware that the police were hideously torturing people who did not agree with the politics of the State. They were torturing them. You see where one could go in a political diatribe, which this isn't. In Italy when the state overreacts, anarchist attacks virtually end.

Now, anarchism does not end in Spain. It does not end also for reasons that are perfectly clear already in Buenos Aires. There's still a huge anarchist community of exiles from these Western European countries from all over the place living in London, ironically in one of the more chi-chi parts of London which was then very poor, around Charlotte Street, where you can't afford to have a pint of beer anymore. That's where they live. So, he was wrong about that. The roots of anarchism were too great. But the connection that I want to make, obviously, especially since this is being filmed it's not the place to do it, but when states, including our own, overreact, what they tend to do is to lash out in ways, and imprison unjustly, and torture, and don't give legal rights. What they do is tend to increase the number of those people who despise us.

If you look back, and again the commune is not a bad way of thinking about this, somebody figured out that of all the victims of terrorist attacks, no matter how you define them, the ratio between victims of overreaction by states to victims of anarchist terror--and I'm not apologizing for anarchist terror. I hate it. I'm not apologizing for terror of any kind. I hate it. But the ratio was 260:1. I suppose there's a lesson to be learned there somewhere. But it was fun to follow Emile Henry around, even though I don't admire him, and to try to give you a sense of how people felt when they hated in the 1890s. Their answer was not the same answer as socialists, which are to take power mostly through electoral processes, but to smash the state by blowing it up. See you on Monday.

[end of transcript]

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Lecture 13 Nationalism

European Civilization, 1648-1945: 

Lecture 13

Nationalism

Transcript

October 20, 2008

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Professor John Merriman: It's kind of a complicated lecture today. I want to talk about nationalism and I do so with a skepticism that you'll quickly pick up on. Aggressive nationalism helped unleash the demons of the twentieth century, beginning with World War I, which unleashed even more dangerous demons after that. I want to talk about nationalism and particularly in—a little bit of France, but in places that one doesn't usually consider. I'll end up drawing on my friend Tim Snyder's work to talk a little bit about Lithuania and Belarus, and why their nationalism were very different and, in the second case, didn't really exist at all in the nineteenth century. And I'm going to give a counter example, which I treat in the book but is the Austria-Hungarian Empire.

It's funny, because one couldn't have imagined in the 1970s, looking nostalgically back on the Austria-Hungarian Empire, this polyglot Habsburg regime. But the horrors of the Balkans really made lots of historians and other social scientists look back and try to figure out how it was that—instead of asking why it was the Austria-Hungarian Empire collapsed during World War I, or really at the end of World War I, turning the question around and saying, "How did it hold together so long?" So, the Austria-Hungarian Empire is sort of a counter example to these nationalisms. One of the things that brought the empire down, along with the war, was competing national claims from ethnic minorities within those vast domains.

I want to start with a story. It's a book I read maybe five or six years ago. Histories have their histories, so I'm going to tell the history of this particular book. You'll see kind of what I'm getting at. By the way, I sent out—one of you had a great idea, emailed me saying, "Why don't you send out the terms before the lecture?" That was a great idea. I'd never thought of that. I did it last night, though I didn't put this particular book on it. Anyway, the book is Anastasia Karakasidou's, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990. When I say that histories have their own history, what I mean is the following.

In this book, this anthropologist, who is from both Turkish and Greek extraction on either side of her family, is writing a book about a small part of Macedonia. Macedonia, of course, was heavily contested for centuries. A trade route went through it. In Macedonia there were Turks, and there were Serbs, and there were Bulgarians, and Macedonians, and Greeks. For centuries they had all basically gotten along as that part of the Balkans, as you know, in the past was under the Ottoman Empire and then through a whole series of arrangements, of wars, the Balkan wars before World War I, passed back and forth.

Essentially, that is one of the points of the book, is that basically people got along very well, but that gradually what happened is that among competing national claims that part of Macedonia became seen by Greeks as part of greater Greece. Whenever you hear the term "greater Greece," or "greater Serbia," or "greater Germany," or greater anything, look out. What that means is that in the imaginary, in the view of nationalists, particularly aggressive nationalists, parts of the territories that have large percentages of a certain ethnic group or even in some cases only minorities, but in other cases majorities, should be included, come what may, in the greater state of that particular ethnic group. If you take the example of Kosovo, and Kosovo has about eighty-five percent of the population is made up of Albanian Muslims. Kosovo was part of Serbia. When Milosevic was talking about "greater Serbia," greater Serbia for him could not exist unless Kosovo, with its eighty-five percent of people who weren't Serb, was included in that. Anyway, that's another story.

What happened with this particular book is that when this book was in manuscript, arguing that basically the idea that Macedonia was Greek was a construction, was an invention, an invented identity by Greek nationalists, the press, the university press, I guess since this is being recorded I shouldn't say which one that was, chickened out and decided not to publish the book. At one point they got a bomb threat from Greek nationalists saying that, "If you publish this book, we will blow up your offices in Europe." So, they chickened out. In an example of just utter, craven cowardice refused to publish the book. They sent this author, whom I don't know—I've read the book. It's a really terrific book—and said, "Sorry. We're not going to publish your book. Too bad, contract or no contract." So, University of Chicago Press published the book, and when the book came out this particular author received a lot of hate mail. She received a picture of herself with a picture of a Greek flag stuck through where her heart would be. These are fairly serious threats.

The point of that is not to jump on Greek nationalists or on Serb nationalists, though certainly the Serb ultranationalists have done just an incredible amount of damage in the Balkans over the past decades, but merely to underline the point that national identities are constructed. They're invented. They're, in a way, imaginary. One of the most interesting sort of historical things you could do as an historian is to try to figure out, from where do these identities come? Language plays a lot of it. Maybe if I have time, because I've got to do a lot today, but this is more of a conversation than a lecture. If I have time I might talk a little bit about language in the case of France. But, in doing so, like most people talking about nationalism, I'm drawing on some of the thinking of Benedict Anderson, and his concept that nationalism and the construction of national self-identity represents "imagined communities."

Basically, if you consider yourself a member of X nationality, you are creating links or you are agreeing to links with people whom you don't know, people that live in Portland, Oregon, or people that live in Albuquerque, New Mexico, or people that live in New Jersey, even though we are sitting here in Connecticut. One of the useful aspects of Anderson's account is yet again to look back at the construction of nationalism to see that here we have that old story. It's states and large-scale economic change that are the two driving forces in the construction of national identities.

I've gone on, at least in two lectures and part of another one talking about British national identity—and I'm certainly not going to go through that again, except to say that it was precociously early, the sense of being British. I also argued along the lines that we can now, at least for elites, say that French national identity began to be constructed in at least by the middle of the eighteenth century. When you think of the real hotspots, the real trouble spots of the twentieth century, when you think of the origins of World War I, which we will be doing and thinking out loud together over the next couple weeks, we will be considering Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the Balkans.

What's important to understand, and this is a reasonably decent transition from the initial discussion of this anthropologist's excellent book, is that in most of those places there was no sense of national identity, of being Slovene, of being Czech, of being Croat, of being Bulgarian, of being Ukrainian or Ruthenian—the two are essentially the same—until quite late in the nineteenth century. Part of what's going on in Europe between the 1880s and 1914 is this is an incredible "advancement," if you want to call it that, in thinking with the emergence of ethnic national identities competing and demanding their own states in that part of the world.

When, in late June 1914, a sixteen-year-old heavily-armed guy, Serb nationalist—I once put my feet, which no longer—my feet still exist, but the steps in Sarajevo no longer exist because of all the bombing, in the place where Princip shot Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the assassination that led, because of this sort of entangling diplomatic alliances, to World War I. He was someone who practically could not have existed in the middle of the nineteenth century, even though among Serb elites there was a national sense. I'm going to give you some examples taken from Anderson of even the publication of the very first dictionaries in languages that now are quite common for us to identify with ethnic national states. In fact, some of these languages did not even have their own written dictionaries until the middle of the nineteenth century. That's not so long ago. Nationalism has to be constructed. A sense of self-identity has to be constructed. That's what I want to talk about.

Let me say something at the beginning. Because of the French Revolution and because of the development in Europe and in other places of parliamentary regimes and democracies, it's fairly common to think, "National self-consciousness equals a desire for national states and you can't have that with a monarchy." That's not really true at all. That's influenced, for example, by the experience of the United States. In the United States, the thirteen colonies, English was overwhelmingly the language of the thirteen colonies. They are rebelling in 1776 and all of that against other English-speaking people who happened to have a monarchy. So, "no taxation without representation" really became also a kind of an anti-monarchist sentiment.

If you think of the Spanish, the rebellions in Latin America against Spain, there, too, the rebellions, though there were millions of indigenous peoples who did not speak Spanish, but basically it was a rebellion of Spanish speakers against a monarch that was Spanish, speaking in the case of Spain. If you think about really extreme ethnic nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century, you think of two states which helped kind of push the world to the catastrophe that was World War I, one has to point the finger at both Russia and Germany, which had autocracies. This is jumping ahead a little bit, but I'm providing you an overview. For example, the campaign—this is jumping ahead a little bit—the campaign of Russiafication that was undertaken by the Russian czars, a brutal campaign against non-Russian minorities, was, in part, a response to rebellions within the Russian empire by Poles, for example, who rise up in 1831 and in 1863 and are crushed like grapes. In 1863, Bismarck, the chancellor of Germany, congratulates the czar for stomping on the Polish insurgents. But the campaign of Russiaficiation was part of the re-invention of Russian national identity.

When I talked about Peter the Great, I talked about how he saw himself as this great Russian patriot. Well, aggressive Russian nationalism picks its targets rather systematically in the campaigns of Russiaficiation. The big pogroms, the massacres of Jews in Odessa, in Crimea, and in other places, are cheered on by the Russian czar, by Nicholas II, whom I will talk about when I get to the Russian Revolution, who saw this as a healthy thing, that the Jews are being beaten to death by real Russians. This was part of his campaign of Russiafication.

In the case of Germany you've got this madcap loser, Wilhelm II, cracking bottles of champagne, or not of champagne, but of Riesling, as I said, over big speedy battleships and all of that. Nobody was a more aggressive nationalist than Wilhelm II, the Kaiser, who kept saying rather disingenuously that he was "the number one German" and all of that. We can get rid of the idea that strong national identity necessarily has a parliamentary outcome. In the case of Britain, we're not going to talk about Britain too much, but the case of Britain is pretty interesting, too. But there you have a monarch without real power. Victoria represents in the imaginary of the British citizens the stability and the constitutional settlement of the British Empire. Yet, a couple of points need to be made.

Language is important in all of this, though not always. Maybe if I have time I'll give a Swiss example later on. Basically, in the case of Russian and German nationalism, and French nationalism and even Spanish nationalism, because of the dominance of Castille, one looks back to the time when national languages, which already existed, are used and become identified with this self-identity of national people. Now, Latin was the language. Latin was the language of science, of diplomacy, of everything. Part of what's intriguing and important about the scientific revolution is that vernacular languages begin to be used as a way of communicating scientific discoveries. There's a little bit in that chapter that you read about that. Certainly, language is closely tied to national self-identity.

One of the ways when nationalism is most aggressive and most vulgar is when very ordinary people who are whipped up, egged on or in some ways urged on by elites began identifying people who don't speak the same language is somehow not part of this imagined community. An obvious example would be all the Hungarians who, after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the subsequent treaties named after Paris suburbs, are included in Romania and are treated as outsiders. This is very important even in the origins of the 1989 revolution that brought down the dreadful Ceausescu dictators in Romania. Anyway, the vernacular develops.

If you exclude the cases of Latin America rebelling against Spain and the Americans rebelling against the British, development of these languages, and the use of the languages and their identity with this imagined community is obviously a very important part of this as well. With the development is the concept of being a citizen. This is one of the many reasons the French Revolution is so important. You were no longer the subject of the king, you were a citoyen, or if you're a female you're a citoyenne. Citizenship takes on this kind of linguistic aspect as well. During the French Revolution, there was a revolutionary priest called the Abbé Grégoire. I think I mention him in the book. He thought that all of these regional languages should be squished like grapes, because somehow they stood in the way of a true French national identity.

Language is so terribly complicated. In the case of Italy, which is in some ways a counter example, I think I said before but it's true. At the time of the Italian unification, only about four or five percent of the population of Italy, of the whole boot and Sicily, spoke what is now considered to be Italian. The case of France, which I know more about, is equally fascinating because of the time of the French Revolution half the French population did not speak French. There was a lot of bilingualism, but they did not speak French. If you imagine a map of France, and I think I went through this very quickly before, but if you imagine a map of France and if you start at the top, they spoke Dutch in Dunkirk and places like that. If you move over to Alsace and much of Lorraine, they spoke a German dialect there. That would be a majority language until well after World War I.

How the French tried to get rid of the German is another story, a sort of national aggression, even in the context of Germany's defeat after World War I. If you move further south, as you go to Savoy, don't write this down, but Savoy was annexed to France in 1860. People spoke essentially Piedmontese, which is the language spoken in northern Italy in the strongest state of Italy, Piedmont Sardinia. Then you go further down and they spoke what? They spoke Provencal. Provencal, as in Jean de Florette, and Manon des Sources and these Provencal poets setting up at a place called Les Baux and freezing in the winds of the mistral and reading each other Provençal poetry. Then you go to Languedoc and they spoke Occitan, which is a language of Oc. It's a southern French language. It's a written language. You go to Catalonia and they spoke Catalan. No surprise there. You go into the Basque country and they spoke Basque, which is only remotely connected to Finnish and Magyar. Those are the three hardest languages in Europe. How they got there is another whole story. We don't really know. If you go north, they spoke Gascon. If you go into Brittany, they spoke Breton, which has nothing to do with French at all.

Even in places that didn't have languages there were patois. Patois is a sort of a denigrating term. "Well, they speak patois." In other words, they don't speak really French. In central France they spoke one patois. In the Limousin they spoke another patois that was related to that one. Even in the Loire Valley people spoke patois. This did not condemn them to eternal backwardness. One might say that in the construction of French national identity, there was an argument a long time ago by my late friend Eugen Weber that said that all French national identity had to be constructed between 1880 and 1910, because of railroads, military conscription, and education. Railroads, military conscription, and education. It's easy to see how that would work. In fact, he missed one of the complexities of this glorious country, which is that lots of Breton soldiers didn't learn French until they were in the trenches, if they were lucky enough to survive in World War I, and they still spoke Breton in the 1920s and 1930s. There are still old ladies in Brittany that still speak Breton and their command of French is a bit problematic.

In Corsica they still have many people who speak Corsican. They may or may not feel like they're French. Bilingualism, just as a little aside, in the village where I've spent half my life almost, in the last twenty-five years or so, people spoke patois and not French through the 1930s. That really sort of disappeared. Now older friends of ours understand patois, but they don't speak it. I had something from a book that I needed someone to look at to make sure that what I'd written in patois was correct. Not that I wrote it, but I took it from something. My friend, my boule partner, Lulu, his parents spoke that as their main language, but he couldn't correct it.

Those languages are disappearing. The point of all this is that now the more we know about national self-identity, it's possible to have more than one identity. It's also just a leap of faith to say, "Who are you?" You ask who they are. That they're going to say, "Well, I'm German," or "I'm French" is going to be the first thing that they're going to say. They may say, "I'm from this village," or "I'm from this family," or "I'm from this region," or "I'm Catholic," or Protestant, or Jewish, or Muslim, some response like that. But yet when we think of nationalism, we think of these languages as being motors for elites, first, and then ordinary people to demand that the borders of states be drawn in a way that reflects their ethnicity.

After World War I in the Treaty of Versailles, you've gone to war over the whole damn question of nationalism. All these millions of people get killed, dying in terrible ways—gas and everything else, flamethrowers and machine guns and all this stuff that we'll talk about. And, so, they say, "If we draw the lines around these people and give everybody a state, that will be cool. Then we won't have wars anymore." So, they get all these big maps and these mapmakers and they try to draw these state boundaries after the collapse of the four empires. It doesn't work. You can't do it. You've got winners and you've got losers. If you're going to punish the losers, like Hungary, then you leave Hungary this small country with much of its population living on the other side of borders, and either imagining that that should still be part of Hungary, or wanting themselves to live back in Hungary where there would be nothing for them at all.

Yet, the period we're talking about and the period I began with, you've got this mobilization of elites saying, "Holy cow! We need our own state." Remember a line I already gave you a lecture or two ago, all these Czechs sitting in 1848 in a room like this, not quite as nice. They say, "If the ceiling falls in, that's the end of the Czech national movement." Between 1848, the springtime of the peoples, and 1914, you have millions of people who, a couple decades before that, had absolutely no sense or very little sense of being Slovene, or Slovak, or Croat, or whatever, who are suddenly making national demands and wanting to have a separate state within the context—or to be independent from the Austria-Hungarian Empire. One of those people was the sixteen-year-old boy, Princip, who blows the brains out of Franz Ferdinand and his wife when this car backs up the wrong street in Sarajevo, although some of his friends were out there trying to get him, too. That's just a way of kind of thinking about that stuff.

Let me give you a couple of examples here I wrote down. Ukraine is a huge country, a huge important country, very contested relationship with Russia now because of having gotten Crimea, and Russia wants to have Crimea and all of this. It's a highly contested relationship because of the number of Russians who live in Ukraine and all of that. For Ukrainians, the sense that Ukraine always existed is always taken as a given. The first Ukrainian grammar book, and this is not dissing Ukrainians or anybody, but I'm just saying that the reality is that the first Ukrainian grammar book was published not in 1311 or in 1511, but in 1819 is the very first one. The first Czech-German dictionary—if you're going to have a national identity you've got to have a dictionary so you can translate things between German and Czech. It's a long publication process. It's published in 1935 to 1939, A to Z. The first Czech national organization, the one I just described, starts in 1846. That's pretty recent.

The first Norwegian grammar book, which distinguished Norwegian as a separate language and a separate identity from say Swedish and Danish, is not until 1848. The first dictionary that is making a distinction between Norwegian and Danish isn't until 1850. That's what I mean about the construction of national identity. You have to have a sense that you are part of this imagined community. Having said that, before I talk about a counter example, let me do this like that. Why not? Let me give you a couple examples that I hope make the point. These I'm drawing from Timothy Snyder. Let's look at why at the end of the nineteenth century Lithuanian nationalism develops.

You know Lithuania, capital is Vilnius, big tall basketball players like Sabonis, who played in the NBA. Why Lithuanian nationalism rapidly develops, but only at the end of the nineteenth century, and Belarusian nationalism doesn't develop at all until way in—it's even pushing it to say in the 1920s and 1930s. Now there's this huge Belarus—I was in Poland. The various times I've been to Poland. There was a huge dinner with all these Belarusians who most of them were dissidents and are there to discuss the history of Belarus, but none of them would be claiming that Belarus had a self-identity before the 1930s. But Lithuania existed. Lithuania was part of the Polish-Lithuania commonwealth, which exists basically until the last partition of Poland in 1795, when Poland gets munched, bouffé, by the great powers.

Who do these people think they were? They think they're Polish. They consider themselves Polish. Poles already had a basis for nationalism. They had a written language. They have heroes, Chopin. Chopin didn't go to Paris as a refugee from Russian repression. He went there to further his musical career. But anyway, he wrote lots that had to do with Polish national themes, folklore and all of that. There have been dukes of Lithuania, grand dukes, but they didn't accept Lithuanian as a language. If they wanted to get anywhere, they tried to pass themselves off as Poles. Pilsudski, a name you will come back to who destroyed the Polish republic, as one after another of European states goes authoritarian in the 1920s and 1930s. Pilsudski, who was the hero of the miracle of the Vistula River when the Polish army turns back the Red Army at the end of World War I in just sort of an amazing moment. Pilsudski himself was Lithuanian. But he considered himself Polish. He was absolutely a Lithuanian. Yet there was a Lithuanian language, but it was not spoken by the elites.

Who spoke the Lithuanian language? It was spoken by the peasants. At the end of the nineteenth century, you've suddenly got all these Lithuanian intellectuals and grand dukes and priests and various people saying, "Wait a minute. We are Lithuanians and happily, the Lithuanian peasantry has saved our language." The last Lithuanian duke who spoke Lithuanian died before Columbus discovered America, Tim Snyder informed me. Some may say, "These Lithuanian peasants, we won't treat them anymore as the scum of the earth. They have preserved our language for us." Suddenly, you have poets writing in Lithuanian. It's no longer a disgrace to be seen as a Lithuanian. One of these poets, a guy called Kudirka, who died in 1899, he recalled when he was in school as a smart Lithuanian kid, he said, "My self preservation instinct told me not to speak in Lithuanian and to make sure that no one noticed that my father wore a rough peasant's coat and could only speak Lithuanian. I did my best to speak Polish, even though I spoke it badly."

Polish is a terribly difficult language. There's all these sort of squiggly things. Things don't pronounce like you think they're supposed to. I don't do very well at picking up Polish. "When my father and other relatives visited me, I stayed away from them when I could see that fellow students or gentlemen were watching." He was embarrassed to be basically Lithuanian and the son of a Lithuanian peasant. "I only spoke with them at ease when we were alone or outside. I saw myself as a Pole and thus as a gentleman. I had imbibed the Polish spirit." By the end of the century he sees himself as a Lithuanian. He is one of these people who are pushing Lithuanian nationalism and it is embraced. How does this physically happen? You don't wake up and say, "I was Polish yesterday and a subject of the czar, because Poland is divided between Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. But if you were in the Russian part of what they called Congress Poland, then suddenly today I'm Lithuanian. How does that happen? Because Lithuania is next to Germany. This is also something that will make you again think of what I said about the Enlightenment.

Lots of literature is smuggled into Lithuania in Lithuanian. Therefore, there's this wild profusion of Lithuanian literature that comes into Lithuania, which of course as you know was not independent. It was part of the Russian Empire. So, there's another reason, too, which is for the Russian imperial secret police, the ones that they're really worried about. They're worried about the Poles, because the Poles have risen up in 1831 and in 1863. So they're on the lookout for people that are saying, "Hey, I'm Polish. We want a Polish state." They don't pay much attention. They don't really care about these Lithuanians who are discovering their own self-identity, who are constructing their self-identity. Why doesn't it happen in Belarus? I don't have time to tell you very much about this, but the main thing is that Belarus is a long way away from anywhere at the time.

There isn't any kind of elite in Belarus that embraces Belarussian anything. The language has not seen part of a national self-identity that basically does not exist and would not exist until at least after World War I. Now Lithuanians will look back on their country as if Lithuania had always had this sort of self-identity. Part of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, that was more basically a Polish operation and it was a territorial thing more than any kind of construction of two peoples participating in this thing. Furthermore, Belarussians were not allowed to publish in their own language. Whereas Lithuanian priests began giving sermons in Lithuanian and you've got all this written material coming in the vernacular. Nobody read Belarussian in church. There were no priests to say that "this is our language." Belarussians who were literate could read Polish or Russian or both, but in many cases not what would become Belarussian at all.

By the end of the nineteenth century when you've got these other people insisting that "we're Slovenes" and "we're this and that," Belarussian speakers called themselves Russian if they were Orthodox religion. They called themselves Polish if they were Roman Catholic. If they were simply looking out for themselves, they just called themselves local. They said, "We live in the Russian empire and that's who we are." There was no sense of being Belarussian. There are different outcomes in all of this stuff. Having said that, we're going to get there. Let me give you another example. I want to find this date that will make you at least realize that you can have a national identity and have more than one language. It's very complex. I guess the most interesting case now would be Belgium, which I don't have a lot of time to talk about.

In Belgium, I have friend who works in the Belgian Ministry of Culture in Brussels. About seven years ago I asked him, "Do you think Belgium will exist in ten years?" He said, "I hope not." This guy works for the Belgian Ministry of Culture. This reflects the sharp antagonism between the Flemish, who basically live in the north and east, but above all the northern parts of Belgium, and who are more prosperous and who are more numerous, about say fifty-five percent of the population. Their tensions with the Walloons, that is the French speakers, Liège, and Arlon and all those places, and also in Brussels, which is technically part of the Flemish zone. Because of the bureaucracy and because Brussels is the most important city, it has become this sort of third place hotly contested by the Flemish and real serious tensions there.

If you ask in French what time the train is to Bruges, they're not going to reply. They know perfectly well. They just simply won't reply. Not all of them, but those are serious tensions that are compounded also by the fact that there's going to be, not everybody, but the far right is really tied to Flemish self-identity. The Walloons, that is the French, many of the French speakers want to be attached to France, see their lives as very different. Also, the Walloon part of Belgium is basically the rust belt and the Flemish part is very prosperous in comparison. Yet Belgium, which didn't exist legally until 1831, the revolution of 1830 and 1831 is still there. By the way, there's also five percent tacked on after Versailles around a town called Eupen who speak German. Anyway, there we go. But Belgium is still there.

When I'm in Belgium, which I am frequently, I think, "Now this is really Europe," because of the complexity of it. You can have a national identity without having a single dominant language, if the two sides are tolerant. Let me give you another quick example, and then we've got to rock and roll onto the A-H Empire, a shortcut now. Not Austria-Hungary. I've got to save time, so "A-H" Empire. What about Switzerland? Here you've got Switzerland. If I remember correctly, the statistics, I think the French speaking population is twenty-two percent. German speaking or Swiss Deutsch speaking population is about maybe seventy-one percent, or something like that. You've got an Italian speaking population of about five percent. And you also have another language called Romansch, which is spoken only by a few hundred thousand people. That's three languages already, plus English, because of the international role of Geneva, is the fourth major or recognized language in Switzerland.

Switzerland now is so prosperous, and full of chocolate, and full of banks, and full of watches, and all of that. You think of everybody yodeling and cows running around and everybody's very happy and eating perch out of the lakes. But the Swiss have to create this sense that they have always been a nation. But they haven't. The decentralized, federalist nature of Switzerland was always there. During the Reformation, to say somebody was turning Swiss meant that they were rejecting the demands of their lords, and rejecting the religion imposed by their lords and turning to Protestantism, if they were in a Catholic area or to Catholicism if they were in a Protestant area. The Swiss were big time mercenaries and big time farmers. But Switzerland fought its last war early in the nineteenth century and has been neutral. It's a very complicated story, what happened in Switzerland during World War II. It's very tragic.

The Swiss turned so many Jews back at the frontier and sent them back to Germany, and laundering Nazi money, and all that. I'm not dumping on the Swiss, but it's a complicated story in the case of their neutrality. They decided in 1891, on the 600th anniversary of the Swiss confederation that Switzerland began in 1291. That a bunch of people got together between all the cows and eating chocolate and all that stuff, and they announced that they were Switzerland. Here's again what Anderson means about this sort of imagined community, that you're inventing a kind of date that you said, "We've been like that since then and that's all there is to it." But if you've got all these different languages and the languages are not as far apart as French and Dutch, well in a way they are because Dutch is really, although the Dutch would not see it that way, but is a German dialect. Nonetheless, the Swiss are a lot better at learning each other's language than the French speakers certainly are at learning Dutch, which they view as impossible and don't like their kids having to learning it in school and all that. It's terribly complicated. So, they imagine this community, but it exists.

Switzerland exists. People have a sense of being Swiss, despite these different languages. There are not the economic disparities. Well, there are between urban and rural life, but nothing like the disparity between the Flemish parts of Belgium and the French parts of Belgium, if you exclude Brussels and all that. Let me end in the last five minutes and seven seconds that is allotted to me. Let me end with a counter example, which you can read about. I said at the beginning, inspired by the sheer horror of the Balkans, and some of you aren't old enough to remember, certainly not, my god, I am, all the stuff that happened in the late 1990s. You can probably remember all the massacres and stuff like that.

I said at the very beginning of the hour or the beginning of the fifty minutes that people now tend to look longingly back. They say, "The Austria-Hungarian Empire, it sure lasted a long time." You had fifteen major nationalities. It was kind of a balancing act. It becomes the dual monarchy in 1867, where the Hungarians have, more or less, equal rights. You've got Austria and you've got Hungary. But you've got another thirteen peoples, at least thirteen peoples living within the empire. You've got the Croats, who have their nobility. They're kind of given favorable status. This whole thing is sort of balanced. How does the place stay together? How does Austria-Hungary stay together? I end one of those chapters, that chapter with this very famous scene from the parliament in Vienna where you've got these different ethnic groups playing drums and singing songs and trying to disrupt the speeches by people from the other nationalities. You've got all these problems with the south Slavs wanting at least minimal representation as sort of this "third state" along with Austria and Hungary.

How does the thing stay together? Basically, in this way. I'm just telling you briefly about things that you can read about, but I just wanted to make some sense of it. First of all, the language of the empire is German. To get somewhere in the Austria-Hungarian Empire, you need to know German. So, learning German becomes kind of a social mobility, the way that learning French becomes for somebody from Gascony a form of social mobility. You can get a job in the bureaucracy. If you're going to have a humongous empire going all the way to the rugged terrain of Bosnia-Herzevogina, you've got to have officials and their little hats and their little desks who are going to be running all this stuff. You've got to have a language. The language of the empire is German. This does not mean that people feel that they're German. After all, they're not German. They're German speakers within the Austria-Hungarian empire. It gives them an allegiance to this apparatus.

Secondly, the middle class. The middle class is German, largely, except in Budapest where it's Hungarian. Still, many Germans live in Budapest as well. One of the things I wish I had time to talk about, but you can't talk about everything, is that what you've got in these cities, and I mentioned this in reference the other day. Cities of all of Eastern Europe and central Europe, you have kind of an ethnicization of these cities. All of the cities, whether you're talking about Budapest or you're talking about Warsaw, or anywhere you're talking about, even Vilnius, you have large German populations and also large Jewish populations. In the course of the last decades of the nineteenth century, you have this sort of rival of Estonian peasants into Talin, of Czech peasants into Prague, of Hungarian peasants into Budapest, of Lithuanian peasants into Vilnius, etc., etc. But you've still got, in the Austria-Hungarian case, you still have, even in Budapest, you still have a large middle class that is fundamentally German and believes in the empire.

Next, you've got dynastic loyalty. You've got this old dude, Franz Joseph, who had been there since 1848. He lives until 1916, the same guy. That makes Victoria seem like she had a short reign. People have an allegiance to this dynasty. The Habsburg Dynasty had been dominant in central Europe until they contest the Prussians and lose out in the War of 1966. So you've got this Franz Joseph. Also you've got the Catholic Church. There are lots of Protestants. For example in the Czech lands in Bohemia, where Slovakia is almost overwhelmingly Catholic in what would become Czechoslovakia and then divorce, amicably enough, in 1993. Croatia is overwhelming Catholic, aggressively so.

Despite the fact you have these huge Muslim enclaves in the old what had been the Ottoman empire, you still have this church as a unifying force, not for everybody and certainly not for the Jews, not for the gypsies, of whom are the Roma, who are very many there, and not for protestants and not for orthodox Serbs, which is part of the tensions there as well. They saw Russia as being their protector. You can read more about that, but that's another thing. Finally, you've got the army. The army is a form of social promotion as well. The army doesn't have the bad reputation that the French army did for shooting down young girls, young women protesting in strikes. It doesn't have the reputation that the brutal Garda Civila did in Spain. The army is seen as a useful way of representing the empire. It has a good reputation. German, the language, is the language of command. These soldiers and soldiers are drawn from all of these nationalities, they at least have that in common.

To conclude, the most important question to ask about this empire, particularly in reference to what I've been saying about this whole hour is to not look at why it came apart, but to look at how it held together so long. Given the horrors perpetuated on Europe by aggressive nationalism from then, and even before, as during the French Revolution to this very day, sometimes, and I never thought I'd ever say this about me looking nostalgically back to an empire, but it is interesting and at least food for thought. On that note, bon appétit and see you on Wednesday.

[end of transcript]

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Lecture 12 Nineteen-century cities

European Civilization, 1648-1945: 

Lecture 12

Nineteen-century cities

Transcript

October 13, 2008

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Professor John Merriman: Today, I want to do the impossible and talk about urbanization and urban growth in fifty minutes. It builds on what you're reading and I'll give the classic example, which is the greatest project of human intervention or rebuilding, that is the rebuilding of Paris by that man that my late friend, Richard Cobb, once dissed as the "Alsacian Attila." In doing so, I want to emphasize a couple points. One is that the nineteenth century was a period of phenomenal urban growth and urbanization. I will distinguish those in a minute. Secondly, one of the things that emerges out of this urban growth and urbanization, but particularly the growth of cities large and medium in the nineteenth century, is an increasing geography of class segregation.

The theme of course in Paris, as in other cities—London is a good example—is a more prosperous west and an increasingly less prosperous east. Also, one of the things that I really enjoy talking about in trying to help people understand is why it is that European suburbs are not at all like American suburbs. Why is it that some people feared by elites were perched on the edge of European cities, whether it's Vienna, Paris, or lots of other places, and not in the center; whereas, in the United States, if you think of the riots in 1967, before most of your times, in Detroit, or Newark, or Watts, or East L.A., it was people in the center with the wealthy people in the periphery fearing the poor people living in the center. Why is it just completely different?

I remember in the early 1990s we were doing a book, just a bunch of essays in France, called Banlieues Rouges, which means the red suburbs. I was supposed to write something tying the book together. It was at the time of the Rodney King trial. Most of you are—not of the trial of Rodney King, but when Rodney King, who was an Afro-American who was beaten up by cops in L.A. It was filmed by somebody who just happened to have a camera and was filming this. There was a big trial. The police who beat the hell out of him were acquitted. They were acquitted by a white jury in the suburbs. People in France couldn't get over that, the idea of wealthy people living in the suburbs as opposed to poor people living in the suburbs in Europe. We had to hold the book for a couple weeks until I could figure out how to explain this. That's one theme also under the rubric of center and periphery.

Why are European cities different? Human intervention has something to do with that in the case of Paris. That's fun to talk about, so I'm going to do that in the last half of the talk. Just a few points at the beginning. I sent around, I hope it will reach you, something I sent out on October 16 on this class server, which has most of these terms on the board.

The nineteenth century is a period of both urban growth and urbanization. Why are those different? Urban growth is, say, a population of any city—the population of Vienna rises from, say, 500,000 to 1,000,000. I don't remember the statistics. That is urban growth. Vienna is bigger at the end of the nineteenth century than it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century, or any place you want to pick. But the most important point is that there is urbanization in the nineteenth century. You could have urban growth absolutely and de-urbanization if, at the end of any period that you're looking at, you had more people living in cities, but they represented a smaller percentage of the population. You could actually have de-urbanization if you had more people living in the countryside at the end of the period, relative to those living in the cities. So, it depends on how you define what an urban area is.

In the case of France, where they have all these great censuses all the time, in the Restoration, that is 1815-1830, a city had 1,500 people in it. There's that many people lined up at the Milford Mall when it opens in this country. In 1841 they start using 2,000 people agglomerated, that is, living in an urban—the church, the steeple. Open up the church and look at all the people or whatever. You know what I mean. That's an urban area. In the United States, I have no idea. A city used to be 5,000. I think it may be 25,000 or something like that. It doesn't matter. Depending on what you define as urban, there's a remarkable increase in the urban population in the nineteenth century.

It's not just big, huge cities like Naples, or Constantinople, or London, which is so enormous compared to Paris, compared to any city spatially. But it's also small towns that increase in size because of industrial, commercial, administrative functions. All this is perfectly obvious. The nineteenth century is the growth of big, big cities and the first conurbations, that is, cities that just run into each other, such as now for example Boston to Washington is practically a conurbation. In France it would be Lille, Tourcoing, Roubaix. In the north of England it would be Manchester and its expanding suburbs. That's all perfectly obvious.

The next step is to say, "Where does the population of cities come from, and who are all these people that are increasing the population of cities and are part of this process, in a statistical sense, of urban growth?" The second point that I'll make is what people thought about this. What did they think about these teeming cities? "Teeming" was a word that they started to use to describe these cities that seemed to be kind of runaway cities. First of all, I'm not going to write this on the board, despite the fact it's the only mathematical formula that I even know. If you were trying to explain the growth of any city from Point 1 in time to Point 2 in time, what you do is simply look at the population at Point 1 in time, say 1811 or something like that. Then you try to find out where the population came from that increased it to Point 2 in time, if the city reclassified what was considered urban, if they annexed its suburbs. That's what Lyons does in 1852, or Paris does in 1860 on January 1, or almost anywhere they do this. That would be one factor. Then you would have births minus deaths.

Do you have a natural increase in population? The other thing is in versus out migration. Do you have more people arriving in the city than leaving it? There are people leaving and people arriving all the time. But if you look at particularly the first half of the nineteenth century, to make a generalization, more people die in cities than are born there, because cities are very unhealthy places, which helps create this kind of image of biological sickness that I'll discuss in a minute, that I'll evoke with some conservative commentators from those times. What do I mean by that? The average life expectancy in Manchester, counting infant mortality, so it's a little bit exaggerated, was about nineteen years old. You guys would have about had it. Lille, in the north of France, is the same thing. That's pretty young. But that counts life expectancy.

If you made it to the ripe old age of eighteen, then your chances of living longer were pretty gray. You still had places where you have phenomenal, still cases particularly in areas where you have all these spinsters in Brittany and in Ireland, of old women who live a very long time. Women lived and still live longer than men. Another reason why you have more people dying in cities, among other reasons, is infanticide. Foundling homes in these big cities. You name the big city—Rome, Berlin, anywhere you want, St. Petersburg, Moscow—they have huge foundling homes with thousands and thousands of babies abandoned every year. One-third of those babies die before the end of the next year. Infanticide. The church, which obviously opposes infanticide and obviously opposes abortion in the nineteenth century, what they do is they finally agree to put in these little things called tours, T-O-U-R-S.

It's an awful example to give and it comes out of an institution that no longer exists, Machine City, but anyplace that you have those kind of machines and you put money in and you hope that the window is going to turn around and actually give you your M&Ms. To make a crass example, that's what these tours were. They encouraged young women, usually unmarried or uncoupled women, to abandon their babies instead of exposing them and having them die. You put your baby in the foundling homes. You ring the bell, you put the baby in this little thing that turns around and then the good sister comes and takes the baby to the foundling home. If all goes well, the baby will be there in a year, but one-third of them are not there in a year.

You've got a lot of babies who die. This increases the mortality rate. Then you've also got a lot of old people who come into the cities—and young people—to beg, seeking those last vestiges of charity, who are clutching at passersby as they go to church, and who some people give them money and most of the people don't give them money. Often they form part of the community, which is obviously the case here at Yale. A lot of the older people die. Policemen going on their rounds in any city, Milan, or Turin, or anywhere, are going to find dead people the next morning. You've got more people that die in cities than are born there, really, in most places way into the nineteenth century.

The point is obviously that it's immigration that causes urbanization and urban growth. Massive immigration, usually from the hinterland, that is the region around cities. In the case of Berlin, northern Germans from Brandenburg or Pomerania and many Poles were moving into Berlin. There were very poor people moving into Berlin. In the case of Paris, people who come into Paris are from Normandy, or from Champagne, or from central France where a lot of them are seasonal migrants and they ended up living there permanently. In the 1880s you've got a huge wave of Bretons from Brittany who don't speak French. If you go to the station of Montparnasse, you'll see a lot of the cafes around Montparnasse are named after Breton towns—"à la ville de Saint-Brieuc," la ville de Dinon. Still today at that station, Montparnasse, the first thing you see when you get off a train there is a sign for public assistance for Bretons. It's in the station at Montparnasse.

The population in Marseilles includes lots of people from the south of France, from Provence, but also Italians. This is very obvious. People who move into Barcelona are far more likely to be Catalan than they are to be Galician, or Castilian or something. This is all obvious. There's no surprises there. The image that people had of this rapid migration into cities of poor people. The majority of people who moved to these cities are poorer than the people who are already there. In the case of the 1950s and 1960s, in most of the cities it's not the case. The 1950s and 1960s they were young professional couples who get enough money to come to rent an apartment in London, good luck, or to buy an apartment in London, or in Berlin, or someplace else, or Munich.

In the nineteenth century you have waves of poor people. The kinds of people you've seen before who are coming to work as domestic servants, coming to work as day laborers. In the case of London, coming to work on the teeming—there's that word again—docks of the Thames River, as London is that imperial city looking out on its vast empire. The interesting thing about London, I wish we had days to talk about this stuff, but it's really only in London that you had people of color. You could find them already by the end of the nineteenth-century, people coming from India, from what would become Pakistan, people coming from the Caribbean. In other cities, you simply didn't have that. The number of North Africans coming to Paris is merely a trickle really until after World War I.

Anyway, contemporaries had the idea that what this whole process was, and I should have written this on the board, but you can write it down if you would please, called the uprooting hypothesis. They didn't call it that. That's social science from the 1960s. These people were uprooted from their steady, rural roots of organized religion and from family support and they are thrown into the maelstrom, into the chaos—sometimes a creative chaos, but nonetheless, the perception was a dangerous chaos that was urban life.

The result of all of this was that revolution becomes seen as an extension of purse snatching. In fact, some of the bad social science from the 1960s in trying to explain the riots in Detroit and places like that said, "Well, you've got a lot of poor people coming from Alabama and Arkansas," which is certainly the case, "or from South and North Carolina move up to Detroit and try to get a job in the factories there. They get to Detroit and they just freak out, because those rural roots have been cut." You still see this in various electoral campaigns even today, even as I speak, this idea that cosmopolitanism, which is also by the way in almost every language sort of a code word for anti-Semitism.

When people say, "Cities are so cosmopolitan," they meant they are full of Jews. This is particularly true in this sort of anti-Semitism and racism of eastern and central Europe where you had such a large Jewish population living in cities like Prague, Budapest, Vilnius, Riga, just about anywhere you could name. With the kind of increase in ethnic populations with the Estonization of Tallinn or the Czechization of Prague, you had fewer Germans and fewer Jews living in those cities, but you had this sort of anti-Semitic discourse that lingers. Vienna is the classic case. Vienna goes from being sort of a liberal city in the 1850s and 1860s to sort of a hotbed of anti-Semitism, where the mayor of Vienna at the end of the nineteenth century, a buffoon called Carl Lueger, says, "I say who's a Jew." That's one of his more infamous statements. "I declare who's a Jew and who isn't."

Of course, one wants to understand how Adolf Hitler got his anti-Semitism. It really comes from World War I, but the basis was already laid there by growing up in Austria in the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century. If you think about that, does this massive immigration necessarily lead to urban chaos? The answer is obviously not. We have the effect that now we know a lot about, historians, and social scientists, and social geographers, and sociologists, which is called chain migration. Take the case of China. People who have studied Beijing discovered a long time ago, I remember this from days when I was studying Chinese history back at Michigan, and all these people pouring into Beijing in the nineteenth century. They formed native places associations. It's obvious. You get together with people that you know from your part of China. They are sort of the intermediaries between you and the city.

The Irish are a classic case. We've already seen how the British elite are scared the hell out of the Irish, of the Irish, because they're Catholic and all that. They don't just pour into Manchester, Liverpool, and London and freak out. It doesn't work like that at all. They live with their families. Their families make a little money and say, "Why don't you come along?" It's the same thing. Look at the case of America, people coming to the United States at the end of the nineteenth century first of all massively from northern Italy and then in the twentieth century from southern Italy. They send money back all the time. It's very different than the Germans who came to the United States. They were almost never in contact with their families again, relatively, and the same with Swiss. But the Italians always stayed in contact.

In any case, all these people, it's very sensible. If you come from California to Yale, there are a couple high schools in L.A. that send all of these students to Yale. If you're kind of freaking out when you get to Yale and saying, "All these people are all so smart," or whatever, then the next thing you do is you go to people that you wouldn't even say hello to in high school and say, "Why don't we hang out tonight," or something like that. You find people who have origins like you, geographic or whatever, and hang out with them. It's a logical thing. It happens every single time.

In the case of people moving to Paris, Limousins, people from the center part of France, Limousins, they live in certain neighborhoods around the center of Paris in the way that Bretons lived around what became the station of Montparnasse. This is chain migration. You see it in Philadelphia. You see it in London. You see it in Moscow. You see it in St. Petersburg. You see it everywhere. But, having said that, that's not the way contemporaries viewed this.

Let me just give you a couple examples of how often well-meaning, but not always, contemporaries saw the phenomenon of urbanization and urban growth. These are taken from an excellent study by Andrew Lees. Let's listen to a preacher called James Shergold Boone, minister of St. John's church in the Paddington district of London. This is his sermon. When he's talking about cities, he's evoking Sodom and Gomorrah. "The very extent of edifices and the very collection of vast masses of human beings onto one spot, humanity remaining what it is (bad is what he means), must be fraught with moral infection."

They continually use words like "infection," that there's a biological inequality of people with each other. The poor are biologically less likely to, in a world where Darwin and post-Darwin misuse of Darwin is very important, to survive the challenges of illness of disease. In illness, the cholera carries away poor people more than rich people. Going back to the good minister,

Cities are the centers and theatres of human ambition, human cupidity, human pleasure. On the one side, the appetites, the passions, the carnal corruptions of man are forced in a hotbed into a rank and file luxuriance, and countless evils which would otherwise have a feeble and difficult existence are struck out into activity and warmth [this is biological contagion. This is a disease metaphor constantly] by mere contact with each other. On the other side, many constraints and safeguards are weakened or even withdrawn.

This is what I mean by leaving those imaginary rural roots in which solidarity was considered to be automatic and family support so very, very important. He goes on. "In cities there is a complication of evils. External forces cooperate with inward desires." You can conquer those inward bad desires in the countryside, but all is lost in the demon rum of moral corruption. The reality is from urban life, etc., etc. Sir Charles Shaw, who was police chief of Manchester, described the residents of industrial cities. He called the residents of industrial cities such as his own as "the debris which the vast whirlpool of human affairs deposited here in one of its eddies, associated but not united, contiguous but not connected." That's a perfect description of the uprooting hypothesis. There's nothing you can do to save people from themselves. To take an example from Paris, because I'm going to talk about Paris in a while, in the 1830s a certain Vicomte—quite forgettable—exclaimed,

How ugly Paris seems after one year away. How one stifles in these dark, damp, narrow corridors [damp, that's a key word in all this] which you are pleased to call the streets of Paris. One would think that it was an underground city, so sluggish in the air, so profound the obscurity. In it thousands of people live, bustle, throng in the liquid darkness, like reptiles in a marsh.

Or Victor Hugo. "Cities, like forests, have their dens in which hide all the vilest and most terrible monsters. All is ferocious." It couldn't be any more condemning than—particularly in Germany, where the whole sense of having a hometown, of being attached to a particular space and all of the corruption that comes from big cities. You see this over and over again. Take New York. Here's another reverend, the Rev. Amory D. Mayo, who attacked the city.

All the dangers of the town may be summed up here, that here withdrawn from the blessed influence of nature [that is, out of the country] and set face to face against humanity, mankind loses his own nature and becomes a new and artificial creature, an unhuman cog in a social machinery that works like fate.

Again, in Émile Zola, the theme of fate is terribly important, of destiny along with, as you'll see, people that have those, if you've read other Zola, that have the bad genes. They've got the drinking genes or whatever. You find all this appalling stuff. Here's another one in a lecture in 1844, The Young Americans.

The cities drain the country of the best part of its population, the flower of its youth of both sexes. They go into the town and the country is cultivated by a so much inferior class.

Et cetera, et cetera. That was the image. And, of course, all of the revolutions have a lot to do with that. Simon, I can't find my wand. Is it up there? It's not? Voilà. Can you do it? Thanks. Let's look at an example of this. I'm sorry, I can't click. I'm just going to have to wave my hands frenetically, or something, or jump up and down. I want you to look at Paris and think about what I've said. This is Paris in 1839. Compared to London—I don't have to talk about this. In London you can walk miles and you're still staggering around looking for the next Tube stop, because it's about three times as big, at least three times as big physically. Paris, in 1837 you could walk from the Arc de Triomphe, which is up on the left, to the ending about an hour and a half. This is before the inner suburbs are annexed for tax reasons, but also for reasons of imposing order on the troublesome periphery. This is part of the lecture.

What you've got is, if you know Paris at all, it doesn't matter if you don't know Paris, here's the Garden of Luxemburg. You've got the Tuileries up along the Seine there. You've got your basic Seine river. You did have three islands, now there are but two. They cemented that one over. Ile Saint-Louis there, which is now one of the great tourist traps in Western civilization, but it's still beautiful. There's Cité with old Notre Dame right in the middle. You've got an enormous population. You've got in the central districts three times the density of population that you have now. We have an apartment in the Marais a couple of blocks up from Notre Dame. The density there in the 1840s in this neighborhood which is called the Arcis [today it is just part of the Marais], was three times what it is now. You've got this enormous implosion of people into the center from the provinces.

Next one, please. Voilà. The reason I put this up here, this is the first photo of Paris. This is what you call the daguerreotypedaguerreotype. I can identify this as—I'm sure not the only one, but this is the faubourg. It's an English word as well as French. It means it's sort of an extension of the town. It's a difficult etymology. It doesn't really come from false bourg, but from other things. It's beyond the walls. But this is the first one. This is also from about 1837. Now, Haussmann, the Alsacian Attila, he built these boulevards that became the staging ground for the so-called Belle Époque. But there were also boulevards anywhere around, because the boulevards were where the walls had once been. Vienna is a great example. The rings around Vienna were the rings where the walls had been that were knocked down as the city grew. In Berlin you find the same thing.

Next, please. This is cheating a little bit. This is just unhealthy. This is an eighteenth-century hat. Look at the guy. He's a nineteenth-century guy looking progressively forward to the nineteenth century with his bourgeois outfit. This could be the Restoration, actually. He's going to get hit. "It's raining," he says, but it's not. It's a chamber pot being dumped on his head. In the 1860s only about ten percent of buildings had water above the second floor. Next, please. This is by a guy called Charles Meryon. It doesn't matter. The point of this is this is Cité. There's Notre Dame there, before Viollet-le-Duc's big spire on it.

The point is that before the rebuilding of Paris this was among the most densely populated parts of Paris. At the end of the period, that is 1870, it's the least densely populated part of Paris. Because—remember capitalism and the state? They build government buildings. The hospital is one of them. The Prefecture of Police, which had all the fighting around it in 1944, in August, was built as well. These places disappear. The morgue, one of the more important morgues was here also. That again, gave the idea of the disease of the center city. Next, please. Name those people. There we go.

Paris on the left. It's 1850. Paris on the right. They're all running together. You see there's a lot more people. You have the filling-in of the center. You've got the periphery with the emergence of these suburbs. It's the suburbs that have increasingly poor people living in them who can't afford to live in the center of Paris. That's the big difference. That's a big, big difference. You have a customs barrier around Paris. Every time you bring things into the city, or any other French city, you have to pay taxes on it. A six-pack of beer, you pay a tax. You have more space outside the city walls, so that's where you build factories. You're nearer to the canals and to railroads, so that's where you build factories. The center city froze the unwanted industries, the dirty industries—soap, chemical, etc.—outside.

Paris doesn't de-industrialize. You still have the garment industry. But the dirty industries, the big industries stay on the outside. That's where your labor force lives. How different that is than Philadelphia or Detroit, where you already had all this space and you've got the population moving into big central areas and essentially staying there. To be sure, in the United States, we have places like a very small part of New Orleans. You've got San Francisco. You've got Beacon Hill. You've got Manhattan. You've got places where you've got a lot of wealthy people living in the center city. But places like Detroit are more really common of the American experience.

Next, please. I can remember when I was a kid, when I was younger than you, I think, going to a Yankee-Tiger doubleheader in 1967. Roy Whit played third base. We walked out and the city of Detroit was on fire because of the riots. It's still all burned out there. One of the interesting things was Grosse Pointe, Michigan, which is a very fancy place. We have a lot of students here from Grosse Pointe. I'm not dissing Grosse Pointe, Michigan, but the municipal council tried to figure out a way that you couldn't get to Grosse Pointe from the center of Detroit unless you had a map, unless you really knew how to get there to try to keep "them," that is, the poor people of the center, from going to the suburbs. The upper classes of Grosse Pointe armed themselves with their hunting rifles, just as the constables had in central London in 1848. The spatial juxtaposition is incredible.

Next. Oh, here we go. Those were lots of people in the center. The theme here is overcrowding. Here is the Market of the Innocents, which it's called. Now it's down by the forum Les Halles. Lots of people. Then the big market Haussman built would later be torn down. Lots of people in the middle. That's a theme. Next, please. The Rue Pirouette in 1860. These are really old medieval buildings. A lot of them get destroyed by the rebuilding. Next, please. Violà, this is a good one. This is one of the streets that would disappear. You could say, "What the hell is he talking about? Where are all those people?" If you have really good eyes, you can see that there are a few people here, because of these long exposures, there's actually some people standing there. This had already been condemned to be destroyed, rather like the Rue Transonain. It had part of the collective memory of the massacre there.

What is this in the center? It's a ditch down where sewage went. There were some sewers in Paris, but it was very unhealthy. In these areas, this is right near the Panthéon, that is sort of in the center left, eastern part of Paris. People just get destroyed by the cholera in 1832, and again in 1849, and again in the 1880s, in 1884. Fundamental inequality before death of the poor. This street—this is actually a great photo. This is by a guy called Charles Marville, who went around and took pictures of these neighborhoods that were going to disappear. Don't worry about the names. Don't worry about the streets. I'm trying just to make a point. Not everybody lived on those streets. In the second empire, that is 1852-1870, Napoleon III, people lived it up. A lot of Zola's novels are really amazing about that. He didn't like Louis Napoleon terribly much.

This is living it up in a big banquet in a big hotel. Already you can see the wine glasses. They're starting to put the wine glasses in connection with the food. That's something that comes in the nineteenth century, the idea of having red wine with cheese. You do have white wine with goat's cheese. Or having white wine with—most with fish and fowl and that kind of thing, and these long, elaborate banquets of one course following another. I can hardly condemn that, having sat through a few thousand of them myself. Anyway, there we go. Fancy people.

Next, please. This is revolution in 1830. The bourgeois guy doesn't belong there. He never went out there anyway. Marianne—this is a highly romantic view of death. Here's your street urchin there, who's fighting the good fight in 1830. This is Delacroix's famous Liberty Leading the People. This is an enormous painting. These people look like they're kind of playacting. They're kind of saying, "Oh, I'm dead now." A few minutes later they're going to get up again. This is very romanticized. Next, please.

Compare this to Meissonier. This is a very underappreciated painting. Again, the name doesn't matter. It meant something to him and it does to art people, but this is called The Barricade. This is only eighteen years later. This is 1848. This is real death. These are ordinary people. Again, look at the gray-green, the sick corridors. This is an affectionate look at people who are dying for a good cause in the center of Paris. Louis Napoleon, Napoleon III, didn't want revolution again. Since there were barricades in so many of these revolutions, barricades begin on the day of the barricades in Paris in 1572, or something like that, before this course stokes up. He said, "Let's build the boulevards so wide that you can't build barricades across them." In 1944 and in 1968 barricades were in the same places, often, where the revolutionary barricades had been in 1789 or in 1848 or 1871.

These guys, that's Napoleon, the guy with the pen. That's Haussmann, who was born in Paris but had Alsacian parents. He's in the middle. Louis Napoleon flops a map down and says, "Build big boulevards through this teeming city," "teeming" used for the third time. He does that for three reasons. One, two, three. One, to bring more air into Paris, more boulevards with sewers underneath them. Boulevards mean better transportation, more light. Secondly, he does this to increase the flow of capital. It's not a coincidence that department stores are built on these boulevards. Some of the ones are still there. The shopkeepers not near department store got wiped out. They were really mad. Very extreme rightwing voting at the end of the nineteenth century. The ones near the department stores do very well. Third, and he says it in Haussmann's memoirs, Louis Napoleon wants these built so you can't have barricades. He builds these boulevards around and through the traditional revolutionary areas. The result is lots of people pack up and they leave.

Next. We're going to go through the next ones fairly quickly. Here's Paris 1855. Belleville up there, or La Villette, or Montmartre there, which has a god-awful church, Sacré-Coeur, built on it after 1871. Those were annexed as suburbs in 1860. It's inner suburbs annexed into Paris. This wall here is the limit of Paris today. You still have people farming in Vaugirard and these places, Grenelle. All that will stop. By 1870 this is all sort of packed with people. The people living in Belleville, which is on a hill, were people many of whom were forced out of the central quarters by high rents. They are the ones perched dangerously, from the point of view of the center, on the periphery.

Ironically, as the middle classes move further and further west, they lost their contact with ordinary people. A lot of the stuff they're reading is based upon—they don't really see those people up there. Maybe they walk down the hill, they can't afford to take the horse-drawn carriages, the omnibuses, to be servants in their houses. These spatial things are very interesting. You find them in other cities, too. Here, they take the map and they say, "Let's build boulevards." You don't have to know anything about Paris to know that there wasn't any north-south—north is up there; south is down toward me—thoroughfare, and they built Boulevard Saint Michel, Boulevard Strasbourg, Boulevard Saint Denis that goes up to the station of the east with the station of the north, right to the left. Étoile, up here, the boulevards help create the kind of star notion. Étoile means star. It looks like a star around the Arc de Triomphe and the big grand crossing that I'll show you in a minute that gives you the west-east access, as well as some other ones, too.

They do a lot of building. They knock down a whole hill. This is now where the Palace of Trocadéro is, lots of work employing lots of people, so the housing workers like them. In 1855, let's look at—you're walking through the Gallery of Machines at one of these world fairs. Because Victoria had one in 1851, Louis Napoleon's got to have one, too. He has two. He has one in 1855 and another one in 1866 or 1867. You're walking along here. You can look at paintings. Above all, you can look at machines. You can look at things you can buy. That's the principle of these expositions. Paris is on stage. That's the principle of a department store. You can walk through a department store and you can buy forty-nine different kinds of shawls, ranging from very cheap ones to very expensive ones. It's the same principle.

The boulevards are really an extension of, as my friend Phillip Nord once argued and so have a lot of other people, these department stores themselves. They become sort of a staging area for what became known as the Belle Epoque. It wasn't so belle for people who didn't have any money, because those were hard economic times. These department stores still exist. The BHV, the Bazaar de l'Hotel de Ville still exists in Paris. Bon Marché. There's a terrific book on Bon Marché by Michael Miller. It's still there. Zola called them "the cathedrals of modernity." Already in the 1850s they had singing groups singing Christmas carols at Christmas. People would come. They couldn't afford to buy anything and just be part of the spectacle.

Paris became a spectacle in itself. The boulevards were part of this. These aren't very good prints, but he was so important he became-to haussmann something was to bulldoze it. Maybe to "Merriman" something would be to drink a good bottle of Côtes du Rhône. Maybe one day that will be mine. Maybe I'll get a French verb. I'm just kidding. But anyway, haussmannisation is to bulldoze something. This is called the haussmannisation of a neighborhood. Here, these people are getting the equivalent of about ten dollars, forced out of their houses. They've got their dog. They've got everything they own there. Look at the mattress. A mattress is the last thing you ever pawned. There's the mattress. They're leaving.

The next one, please. This is called Haussmann Part II. Here you've got your Haussmannian vista. You've got the big boulevards with all these not then so fancy balcony railings. The real fancy ones come later in the Third Republic. This is really St. Augustine. It's a hideous church. Some people really like it. My dear friend Bob Herbert thinks it's not bad, the art historian. This is haussmannisation of a corridor, part two, of a neighborhood. Next, please. You've got people building. That's the Tour Saint-Jacques, which is still there. A lot of these are little teeny people who are from the center part of France or the builders. Everybody's aware of this building.

Here you can say, "How are we going to get from Point 1, which is down by the Seine, the Rue de Rivoli, which has been expanded? How do you get to this new opera they're building?" First you tip off your friends so they make a lot of money on the deal, knowing what to sell and what to buy. Then you take a ruler. You didn't have to be an architectural genius. You draw a straight line. That's what I mean by "imperialism of the straight line."

Next, please. You're getting to the opera. There you can see it rising up, Garnier's opera. It rises up out of the smoke, out of the cloud of destruction. I'm getting carried away. Next, please. There it's being built. There it is. You are here looking at what now is the largest concentration of pickpockets in the western world, because there's an American Express right near there. You see all these Americans. They've got their big wallets. They say, "Where's the American Express, dear?" It's right over here. Voop! Their wallets are out of there before they hit the top step of the Métro. That baby's gone. Anyway, that's the Place Vendôme down there. Next, please. There it is in 1900. Here again, imperialism in a straight line. There you've got—maybe I'll do a thing on blowing up this building here. Sometime we'll come back to this maybe. Anyway, there you go.

Here's the great crossing in the center of Paris. This is—you're crossing from Ile of Cité here and you're going up. Here's the Gare de l"Est, the station of the east there. This way you're looking down east. There's the Tour Saint Jacques. The only point is that they expand this down toward Saint Antoine and the Faubourg Saint Antoine where the revolutionaries were in 1848, and where they were in 1789, and where they were in 1792, as well, and at other times in the French Revolution, 1830 for example. They're down there. That's the big crossing point, la grande croisée.

There's the Gare de l'Est. When I see that station it's so sad. That's where all the people drinking champagne went in 1914 shouting, "À Berlin." Just as in Hauptbahnhof, in Berlin they were shouting "Nacht Paris." Of course, they don't come back. So many Jews were deported from here, if they were sent from the Galle du Nord to Drancy, if they were on the direct line to Auschwitz or the other death camps, they went through this station. Next. Arrested by French police, 1942-1943. He builds Les Halles, the big market. My friend Vincent Scully, who teaches in here afterward, he would do a better job on this, but I do remember the first time I was ever in Paris. I don't know how old I was. Younger than I once was and than I am now, or younger than I'll be, or whatever the line is. I met somebody on a bus in Germany. She was a sculpturess and she kindly invited me to stay in her apartment. It was all on the up and up. It was no problem. She took me down in the middle of the night to see this place, and to see the restaurants where you'd see the wealthy people eating, and the butchers with their smocks covered with Beaujolais and also with animal blood. It was really cool. Then they tore this down. They tore it down to build a whole bunch of unsuccessful places and the filthy destruction of a monument.

We need Vince Scully here to do this. People chain themselves to these things. They say, "Can't you leave just one so you people would know what these are like? Can't you leave just one?" They said, "No, we can make some money here. We can get in—soon we'll have McDonald's all over the place. We'll make some money." They got rid of them and there's none of them left. It's a tragedy. Haussmann built those. I'm not a big Haussmann guy. Here is a Haussmann building right around the corner from our apartment in Paris on the rue du Temple. Here's a building with more Third Republic. These are the buildings that he built along the boulevards.

Next, please. I've got to rocket on. If you follow art history you know there's a very famous painting by Caillebotte that shows the anonymity. It's called Paris with the Effect of Rain. It's right here on this place, which is where two boulevards come together. That's part of the thing, too. You've got your basic middle class people. They were carrying umbrellas. They are disconnected. They would never say hello to each other, and they're crossing this intersection that becomes part of the heartbeat of urban life, or something dramatic like that.

Next, please. You've got these boulevards. This already existed, because it was where the walls had once been. This is the Boulevard Montmartre. Next, please. Oh, man. There was supposed to be another one there. Anyway, no problem. My bad. If you were flying around overhead, you would look down here. Here is Notre Dame. There's Les Halles up in that direction. That's the church of Saint Sulpice. You see the big crossing points, the big boulevards that have been built. Here's the big old crossing point there, the Tour Saint Jacques. A bird's eye view of all of this. What I left out was Camille Pissarro's image from that same point where he painted. An impressionist painted because of their interest in light and first view and all of that. There's a lot of important paintings of this.

Renoir didn't like these boulevards. He said they're lined up like troops at a review. That's the most appropriate image of the centralization of state power. Speaking of state power, what happens in the Paris Commune in 1871 is that ordinary people in Paris take arms, as you know. They build barricades across these places. Next, please. Then the troops of the provisional government from Versailles, appropriately enough, come in and they use these same boulevards, the extension of the Rue de Rivoli, the Rue St. Antoine, to go and gun down ordinary people, 25,000 of them. Welcome to the twentieth century in 1871, when you were guilty for whom you were. "À Paris tout le monde était coupable." "In Paris everybody was guilty," said a prosecuting attorney.

Next, please. But the spatial aspects of this are important. This is right. That's the Madeleine. There's just a lot of destruction. Here's Manet's depiction of women being shot. There were these images of rumors that women incendiaries were burning down the wealthy buildings of the property. Les pétroleuses, the female incendiaries. Manet did one and so did Courbet. Next, please. Finally, that's real death. Those are rather small people in tiny caskets who have just been mowed down because they were who they were, that is poor and in people's Paris. They systematically targeted areas like Belleville, because they were identified with the left.

If we could speed through these next few, then we'll be out of here. Next, please. Here again, those are the boulevards with the old gates. Here's what I mean by east-west. In the northwestern part of Paris people were moving into slightly better buildings. In the northeast, more rural looking ones just on the outside, the laundry of combat. We know this is after 1900, because there's a reference to the metro. The metro didn't open until 1900. So, this is probably about 1912, actually there. People on the periphery coming in to pawn their mattresses. Here's the gates when you were outside. Again, why are all the factories on the outside, all the ordinary people? Because life was cheaper out there. That's why beyond Montparnasse are all these café areas that are still in Paris, now, but were once out there, because it was cheaper to be out there.

At the end of her sad, short, drunken life, Gervaise in L'Assommoir goes out to hook on the periphery, on the boulevard. She gets poorer and poorer. Zola was so well aware of the spatial concomitants of all of this. This is what it was like passing through the barrier. It's outside that the red belt exists. It's outside of all. Vienna is a classic example. In the 1930s you've got the army blasting, firing cannons against the working-class housing perched on the outside of town. "Sires," said one of the ministers to Louis Philippe, "those usines, those factories that you are allowing to be built around Paris, on the outskirts will be the cord that strangles us one day." It's on the outskirts in these industrial suburbs that had once been producing cherries for the urban market and fruit, but now were their factories. It's there that the Communist party did so well in the 1920s and 1930s, and even beyond. They provided social services. They defended people. They were called the mal lotis, people that had inappropriate places to live.

So that, again, was what I meant by center versus periphery and the sense of not belonging to the center, of not belonging to the center. You see the same thing with people living inside of American cities, of not belonging to prosperity. It can contribute to a formation of a counter-society, of kind of a sense of not belonging that creates a sense of belonging. As we are rejected, we too can become powerful. The spatial aspects of this are terribly important. Look at the riots in the suburbs in 2005. We don't have time to talk about that, but that's a fascinating thing. Different people who are marginalized by the center, large populations of North Africans, and of West Africans, and people from the Caribbean. It's the same phenomenon, the center and periphery is there.

Last, and I think I've pulled it off, if you went westward, this is a Monet. This is one of the many regattas at Angers. You went westward for pleasure, not eastward. You went further and further so the middle classes, particularly in the western part of Paris, plant their flag defiantly in Normandy, in Deauville, and in Angoville and all of these places there. It's there that the impressionists paint the Parisian upper classes, who when you go to Deauville you still see all the 75 license plates and the 78s from the Paris region. It's still the place.

There's a social geography of leisure, too, that develops in Paris, as in these other cities. It happens so remarkably in what was not only the bourgeois century, not only the rebellious century, but above all, the urban century where the way in which people lived in very important ways was transformed. Thank you very much. Good luck on the midterm. See you next week. See you on Wednesday.

[end of transcript]

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